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Articles
The McDonnell Douglas Standard in Lending-
Discrimination Cases: A Circuit Split?
Mane Hajdin*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the apparent circuit split on whether the burden-
shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green1 applies in the cases that
involve allegations of discrimination in lending. The issue of whether the
standard applies in such cases is of interest to those who may need to litigate
cases in the specific area of lending discrimination, but not only to them. The
argument against applying the burden-shifting standard in this area implies a
certain general understanding of the standard, which may color its operation in
other areas of the law, such as employment discrimination. The argument and its
critical examination is thus of relevance to the antidiscrimination law generally.
Part II of this article outlines the legal background of the issue, and Part III
points to the decisions that form the two sides of the split. Parts IV through VII
examine the decision that created the split and its crucial argument. Parts VIII
and IX show that the split is an aspect of a broader split on the interpretation the
McDonnell Douglas standard. Finally, Part X hows that the decision that created
the split is internally inconsistent and that the split could be regarded as illusory.
II. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS STANDARD
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2
which created the well-known burden-shifting standard for litigation under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' According to that standard, the plaintiff in
such an action first "must carry the initial burden ... of establishing a prima facie
case of racial discrimination .' Once the plaintiff does this, the burden shifts to
the defendant "employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
* Dr. Hajdin is an Instructor in Philosophy at the Dominican University of California, and an Adjunct
Lecturer in philosophy at Santa Clara University, where he is also an Associate of the Markkula Center for
Applicd Ethics. He is the author of The Boundaries of Moral Discourse (1994), The Law of Sexual
Harassment: A Critique (forthcoming), and articles published in scholarly journals in philosophy, as well as the
editor of The Notion of Equality (2001).
1. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
4. 411 U.S. at 802.
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reason"5 for the contested action. Finally, at the third stage of the process, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the purportedly nondiscriminatory
reason presented by the defendant at the second stage was, in fact, a pretext for
discrimination prohibited by the act:6 in other words, that the reason was nothing
but a "coverup.
'7
The Court later clarified the standard by making it explicit, in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,8 that the burden imposed on the
defendant at the second stage is merely a burden of production9 and that "[t]he
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."' Since
that decision, the McDonnell Douglas standard has sometimes been referred to as
the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine standard.'
More recent developments of the standard clarified the relationship between
the second and the third stage. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,'2 the Court
explained that the fact that the defendant, at the second stage, lied about its
reasons for the contested action does not per se constitute pretext for the
purposes of the third stage." Nevertheless, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc. 14 the Court held that such a lie can constitute sufficient evidence of
third-stage pretext to enable the plaintiff to withstand the defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law.'5
For the purposes of this article, the most significant part of the McDonnell
Douglas standard is, however, the first stage: the plaintiff's prima facie case.
According to the original formulation of the standard, the elements of that prima
facie case are:
(i) that [the complainant] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 16
5. Id.
6. Id. at 804.
7. Id. at 805.
8. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
9. Id. at 254-57.
10. Id. at 253.
11. E.g., King v. First Interstate Mortg., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993).
12. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
13. Id. at 515.
14. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
15. Id. at 147-48.
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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The Court tailored this formulation to the facts of McDonnell Douglas,
which involved allegations of race-based discrimination. As courts applied the
standard to discrimination on other than racial grounds, they replaced the
reference to a racial minority in the first element of the prima facie case with
references to "a protected group" or something similar. 7 Given that the
McDonnell Douglas opinion itself acknowledged that the standard may need to
be adapted to "differing factual situations,""' this generalization of the standard
seems uncontroversial and has been used in thousands of cases. Controversy
exists, however, as to how the standard applies to allegations of discrimination
against males or members of majority groups, 9 but that controversy will be set
aside for the purposes of this article.
The reference to qualifications in the second element of the prima facie case
is generally taken as a reference to the minimum, threshold qualifications for the
job.2° The question of whether the plaintiff was better qualified, than the person
hired is usually left for the second stage of the standard's application.
The McDonnell Douglas standard has become one of the most basic features
of antidiscrimination law: it is cited in practically every opinion dealing with
allegations of discrimination." While it was originally formulated for the
purposes of litigation under Title VII, which concerns discrimination in
employment, the standard has been extended to litigation under various other
antidiscrimination statutes. Courts have thus applied the standard in litigation
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,22 Americans with Disabilities
Act, 23 and under the 19th century civil rights statutes generally referred to as
"Section 1981" 24 and "Section 1983." State courts have also adopted the.... 26
standard for litigation under state statutes against discrimination.
17. Among the decisions that introduced such formulations are Smith v. Rexall Drug Co., 415 F. Supp.
591, 593 (E.D.Mo. 1976) (requiring that the plaintiff be "a member of a protected group"); Herrman v.
Coleman, 428 F. Supp. 447, 452 (D.D.C. 1977) (requiring that the plaintiff be "a member of a protected class");
and Bozicevich v. American Airlines, 17 Fair. Emp. Prac. Cases 247, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (requiring that the
plaintiff "belongs to a protected minority").
18. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
19. See generally Scott Black, McDonnell Douglas' Prima Facie Case and the Non-Minority Plaintiff:
Is Modification Required?, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 309 (1995).
20. See, e.g., Netterville v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1986); United States Postal Serv. Bd.
of Governors v. Aikens, 453 U.S. 902, 903-05 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 1. As this article goes to press, McDonnell Douglas has been cited in over 16,000 cases.
22. E.g., Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 5 F.3d 955,
957 (5th Cir. 1993); cf Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (assuming arguendo that the McDonnell Douglas standard is
applicable in actions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
23. E.g., Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995); Leffel v. Valley Fin. Serv.,
113 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 1997).
24. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989).
25. E.g., Helland v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 330-31 (7th Cir. 1996); Lee v. Russell
County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773-76 (11th Cir. 1982); cf. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506 n.1
(assuming that the McDonnell Douglas standard is applicable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case).
26. E.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354-355, 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (2000); Bowles v.
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III. THE APPARENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
Because of the ubiquity of the McDonnell Douglas standard within the anti-
discrimination law, it is natural to expect that it would also be applied in
litigation about discrimination in lending27 under the Equal Credit Opportunity
25 29Act" and the Fair Housing Act. Several courts have, in fact, applied the standard
in such litigation, apparently without expecting that the application would turn
out to be controversial. Prior to the emergence of the split that is the subject
matter of this article, such decisions were made by the First,3 ° Fourth,3 Fifth,32
and Eighth33 Circuits, as well as district courts within the Second3 4 and Seventh
Circuits." (The Second Circuit affirmed one of the district court decisions, but
did so without opinion.)3 6 The Sixth Circuit made a pronouncement that suggests
that it would do the same.37 The courts that applied the standard generally did so
without much discussion; one explicitly stated that it had "no doubt that the
three-stage McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis applies to Fair Housing Act
cases."
38
In August 1998, the Seventh Circuit, however, decided Latimore v. Citibank
Federal Savings Bank,39 which, for reasons that will be discussed below, held that
the McDonnell Douglas standard is not applicable to discrimination in lending. 40
Since that decision, the First Circuit in Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust'
Keating, 606 P.2d 458, 462-63 (Idaho 1979).
27. For a general theoretical discussion of the reasons why the laws against lending discrimination are
needed, see Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis,
73 TEx.L. REV. 787 (1995).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994).
30. Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1992).
31. Crestar Bank v. Driggs, No. 93-1036, 1993 WL 198187, at * 1 (4th Cir. 1993).
32. Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1558 (5th Cir. 1996).
33. Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1993).
34. Gross v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 669 F. Supp. 50, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Williams v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F. Supp. 447,449 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), afftd, 697 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1982).
35. Saldana v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 93C4164, 1996 WL 332451, at *2 (N.D. I11. June 13,
1996); Milton v. Bancplus Mortgage Corp., No. 96C106, 1996 WL 197532, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1996); A.B. & S.
Auto Serv., Inc. v. South Shore Bank of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 n.6 (N.D. II1. 1997); Thomas v. First
Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind., 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1338 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
36. Williams, 697 F.2d at 302.
37. The Sixth Circuit made a general pronouncement that "the history suggests reviewing E[qual]
C[redit] O[pportunity] A[ct] claims of discrimination using the same framework and burden allocation system
found in Title VII cases," implying that the McDonnell Douglas standard should be applied to such cases.
Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs. Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998). This pronouncement was, however, made in
the context of applying the Act's anti-retaliation provision, not its prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.
38. Ring, 984 F.2d at 926.
39. Latimore v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at715.
41. Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust, 214 F.3d 213 (lst Cir. 2000).
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reaffirmed its allegiance to applying the McDonnell Douglas standard in lending-
discrimination cases, expressly noting that this allegiance contradicted the
42Seventh Circuit's decision. A district court within the Eleventh Circuit also
applied the standard to a claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, expressly
noting the decision in Latimore was to the contrary.
3 The Tenth" and the D.C.4 1
Circuits noted the emerging circuit split on this issue, without taking sides in the
controversy. The Second Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas standard in a
1999 lending-discrimination case, without noting that by doing so it was taking a
side in a circuit split.
46
The Seventh Circuit thus, at the moment, stands alone in maintaining that the
McDonnell Douglas standard does not apply to discrimination in lending. Circuit
splits, however, are not to be resolved by simply following the majority: what
matters is the soundness of reasoning that underlies the opposed positions. So far,
the courts expressly declining to follow the Seventh Circuit have not offered any
argument for doing so. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, did offer an
argument for its position.4'7 That argument, as this article tries to show, cannot be
dismissed lightly, even though it ultimately turns out to be problematic.
IV. THE FACTS OF LATIMORE
Latimore involved a black plaintiff who was denied a loan that was to be
secured by her home.48 The lender's proffered reason for denying the loan was
that the value of the home, as determined by the lender's appraiser, was
insufficient for the loan sought.4 9 The plaintiff claimed, on the basis of a different
appraiser's opinion, that the actual value of the home was significantly greater
than the value found by the lender's appraiser. ° According to the plaintiff, if the
lender's appraiser had determined the value of the home accurately, it would
have been, according to the lender's own criteria, sufficient for the home to serve
as collateral for the loan sought.5' The plaintiff thus argued that the lender's
reliance on the low appraisal and consequential denial of the loan amounted to
discrimination on the basis of race.52 She also argued that the lender's appraiser
42. Id. at 215.
43. Sallion v. Suntrust Bank, Atlanta, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1 327 n.l (N.D. Ga. 2000).
44. Matthiesen v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 173 F.3d 1242, 1246 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Hilgert
v. Mark Twain/Mercantile Bank, No. 99-203 1-GTV, 2000 WL 528053, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 2000).
45. Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179 F.3d 926, 928 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
46. Thompson v. Marine Midland Bank, 1999 WL 752961 (2d Cir. 1999).
47. See infra Part V.
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himself discriminated on the basis of race in making the appraisal. 3
The court's analysis treated Latimore as a case of alleged discrimination on
the basis of the plaintiff's race, even though there are a few hints in the opinion
that the case could have been treated as a case of alleged discrimination on the
basis of the race of the majority of the residents of the neighborhood in which the
home was located. 4 The latter form of discrimination, often referred to as
"redlining," would have required a different kind of analysis.5 ' The claim that this
case involved redlining was somewhat more explicitly considered (and rejected)
in 56in the district court opinion. Given that this article focuses on the general
doctrinal implications of the appellate decision in this case, rather than on the
details of the case itself, it will follow the appellate court in treating Latimore as
a case in which alleged discrimination was based on the plaintiffs race, and it
will ignore its redlining aspects.
V. THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT OF THE OPINION
The court's crucial argument for not applying the McDonnell Douglas
standard to the plaintiff's allegations in Latimore was this:
The fact that a qualified black is passed over for promotion in favor of a
white has been thought sufficiently suspicious to place on the defendant
the minimum burden of presenting a noninvidious reason why the black
lost out. But it is the competitive situation-the black facing off as it
were against the white-that creates the (minimal) suspicion, and there is
no comparable competitive situation in the usual allegation of credit
discrimination. [The plaintiff] was not competing with a white person for
a $51,000 loan. A bank does not announce, "We are making a $51,000
real estate loan today; please submit your applications, and we'll choose
the application that we like best and give that applicant the loan." If a
bank did that, and a black and a white each submitted an application, and
the black's application satisfied the bank's criteria of creditworthiness
and value-to-loan ratio yet the white received the loan, we would have a
situation roughly parallel to that of a McDonnell Douglas case .... But
such cases are rare, and this is not one of them.57
This article first, in Parts V through IX, takes this argument at face value and
treats it as the core of the court's opinion. Later, in Part X, the question will be
53. Id. at 716.
54. Id. at 713, 715.
55. See generally Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining," and the Discriminatory Access to Loans,
Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in
Federal and State Courts, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583 (1996).
56. Latimore v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 979 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. I11. 1997).
57. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714.
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raised of how this argument is related to what the court says elsewhere in the
opinion. The essence of this reasoning of the court can be paraphrased as the
following syllogism:
(1) The McDonnell Douglas standard presupposes that there was a
competition between the plaintiff and other candidates for the
position.
(2) Applicants for credit typically do not compete against each other.
(3) Therefore, the McDonnell Douglas standard is inapplicable to
typical allegations of discrimination in lending.
The first premise of this syllogism finds support in the language of the
McDonnell Douglas opinion, as the fourth element of the prima facie case
(quoted in Part II) refers to persons other than the plaintiff who applied for the
position for which the plaintiff was rejected. 8
What about the second premise? Every lender has only a finite amount of
funds available for lending. This amount is typically less than the aggregate
amount of all the loans that applicants might desire. Therefore, in a very broad
sense of the word "compete," the applicants may be said to be competing against
each other: some of them will fail to get the loans they desire because the lender
will prefer to provide its limited funds to others.59
Nevertheless, several features of typical lending operations, suggested by the
above-quoted language of Latimore, make these operations unlike the more
paradigmatic cases of competition, such as the competition for employment.
First, the funds that a lender has available are fungible; they are not individuated
as specific, identifiable loans. One cannot meaningfully speak of the loan for
which different applicants are competing. In that respect, lending is unlike hiring:
in hiring one can meaningfully speak of the position for which different
applicants are competing. The same is true of certain kinds of promotions.
Second, the amount of an individual loan is typically only a tiny portion of the
total amount of funds that an institutional lender has available at any given
moment.60 That is, again, unlike typical hiring in an ongoing business operation
where there are usually only a few openings at any given time.6 ' Third, a lender
normally does not compare individual applicants directly against each other. A
loan officer of a bank, for example, does not normally examine several
applications simultaneously, trying to determine which ones among them are
58. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
59. See Michele L. Johnson, Casenote, Your Loan Is Denied, but What About Your Lending
Discrimination Suit?: Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1998), 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 185, 216 (1999).
60. In a normal case this remains true constantly, as the lender's available funds are continuously
replenished.
61. In this respect, however, lending is not unlike hiring at a point at which a large business is starting or
significantly expanding its activities.
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stronger than the others. Instead, a lending institution normally establishes a set
of lending criteria and instructs its loan officers to assess each application,
separately from the others, against these criteria. That is unlike a typical hiring
deliberation which involves assessing several applicants at the same time in an
attempt to determine which ones among them are better suited for the opening
than the others.
In view of these features of the lending application process, one can readily
agree that there is a sense of the word "competition" such that the McDonnell
Douglas standard presupposes competition, and, at the same time such that
typical deliberations about credit applications do not involve competition. Both
premises of the syllogism thus seem to be true. The syllogism is quite
compelling, and it is not easy to think of a reason for rejecting it.
VI. THE CRITICISMS OF THE DECISION IN THE LITERATURE
As pointed out above, the courts that rejected the Seventh Circuit's rationale
for not applying the McDonnell Douglas standard have not yet offered any.
arguments for rejecting it. A search for a possible argument against the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning must, therefore, turn to what a small number of law review
commentators have said about Latimore.
So far, the most detailed discussions of Latimore have been provided by
Michele Johnson62 and Erin Dancy63. The extensiveness of their discussions is,
however, deceptive, as most of them are devoted to summarizing the general area
of the law to which the case belongs, 4 its overall significance,65 and relatively
little to a direct examination of the Seventh Circuit's analysis in the case. To the
extent these two authors do engage in such examination, they criticize the court
in general terms for such failings as terseness, 66 not considering the purposes of
67the McDonnell Douglas standard, not explicitly referring to different legal
theories of discrimination, 6s and "overlooking" the "relevance" of the underlying
69statutes (while praising the decisions that did apply the McDonnell Douglas
standard to discrimination in lending for carefully scrutinizing these statutory
provisions). 70 These general criticisms of Latimore may or may not be justified,
but they do very little to refute the opinion's crucial argument. In fact, these
criticisms of the opinion seem to concern its style more than its content. If the
62. Johnson, supra note 59.
63. Erin Elisabeth Dancy, Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank: A Journey through the Labyrinth
of Lending Discrimination, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 233 (1999).
64. Johnson, supra note 59, at 190-207; Dancy, supra note 63, at 239-53.
65. Johnson, supra note 59, at 189-90, 216; Dancy, supra note 63, at 233, 254-56.
66. Johnson, supra note 59, at 213.
67. Id.
68. Dancy, supra note 63, at 252.
69. Id. at 259.
70. Id. at 249.
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above-presented Seventh Circuit's syllogism is sound, that is the end of the
matter: no amount of pondering on the general purposes of the standard or on the
underlying statutes will change the conclusion. Nor would the court being less
"terse" in presenting the argument, on its own, change its soundness. If one
thinks that the syllogism is not sound, one has to explain what specifically is
wrong with it. If the two commentators want their readers to believe that the
defects they claim to have found in the Latimore opinion somehow affect the
soundness of the syllogism, they need to spell out the logical link between these
(very general) defects and the syllogism. Neither has done so.
Dancy says that the McDonnell Douglas standard "has worked effectively"
in other areas of antidiscrimination law, suggesting that this effectiveness
somehow constitutes a reason for applying it to the allegations in lending
discrimination as well.7' But if a standard is, by its own terms, inapplicable to a
particular area of the law (and the Seventh Circuit's syllogism purports to show
this about the McDonnell Douglas standard and the law against discrimination in
lending), then its effectiveness in a different area of the law (whatever precisely
effectiveness is in this context) cannot do anything to make it applicable.
The Latimore decision is also the subject matter of comments by Richard
Hill,72 G. Carol Brani,73 and Kathleen Kelley. 74 These comments, however, consist
almost exclusively of the recitations of the contents of the court's opinion and of
its general background. They do not really engage in a critical examination of the
court's reasoning. Hill75 and Brani76 indicate that they believe that the McDonnell
Douglas standard should apply in lending-discrimination cases, but they do not
offer any argument that would even attempt to establish that the reasoning that
led the Seventh Circuit to the opposite conclusion was logically defective.
VII. DOES LATIMORE DISADVANTAGE PLAINTIFFS?
Further misunderstanding of the logic of Latimore underlies Johnson's,
Dancy's, Hill's, and Brani's comments. The fact that the plaintiff in Latimore has
lost (the Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants)77
seems to have caused these commentators to believe that the court's rejection of
the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas standard generally favors defendants
71. Id.at256.
72. Richard A. Hill, Credit Opportunities, Race, and Presumptions: Does the McDonnell Douglas
Framework Apply in Fair Lending Cases? Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank, 64 Mo. L. REv. 479
(1999).
73. G. Carol Brani, Civil Rights and Mortgage Lending Discrimination: Establishing a Prima Facie
Case Under the Disparate Treatment Theory, 5 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 42 (1999).
74. Kathleen A. Kelley, Casenote, Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir.
1998), 5 RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 85 (1999).
75. Hill, supra note 72, at 500-01.
76. Brani, supra note 73, at 59.
77. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 716.
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in such suits." In other words, they believe that if the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
is rejected and the standard applied in such cases, the plaintiffs would have better
chances of winning. Given that these commentators are all sympathetic to
plaintiffs in antidiscrimination suits, this belief motivates their claims that the
McDonnell Douglas standard should be applied in lending-discrimination cases.
These commentators thus think that by taking the position opposite to that of the
Seventh Circuit, they are advancing the cause of plaintiffs in such cases.
Properly understood, however, the above quoted reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit is not at all hostile to plaintiffs in actions of this kind. To see that, one
need only look carefully at the fourth element of the plaintiff's prima facie claim
under the McDonnell Douglas standard. That element requires that the
complainant show "that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek [applicants] from persons of complainant's
qualifications."79 Adapted to the loan application process, the requirement would
be that the loan remained available and that the lender continued to seek
applications from persons of complainant's qualifications. But, as the crucial
argument of Latimore points out, 80 in a typical lending operation, loans are not
individuated in advance of being awarded; consequently, there is no such thing as
the loan for which different applicants are competing. It follows that, in a typical
case, there cannot be any other persons applying for the same loan as the
plaintiff. This, in turn, entails that if the McDonnell Douglas standard were
applied to a typical lending discrimination case, the plaintiff could not satisfy the
fourth element of the prima facie case. Under the McDonnell Douglas standard,
such cases would thus never proceed beyond the first of the three burden-shifting
stages; all the plaintiffs would lose at the first stage.
If this reasoning is correct, then the Seventh Circuit's decision to not apply
the McDonnell Douglas standard in such cases is not depriving the plaintiffs of
some benefit that they would have had if the standard were applied. Quite the
contrary: the Seventh Circuit removes these cases from the scope of the
McDonnell Douglas standard precisely because it seems that the plaintiffs cannot
profit from the standard anyway. The court sees its decision as simply
articulating what is implied by the standard itself.
VIII. THE UNDERLYING ISSUE
The central argument of Latimore is thus able to withstand all the attacks on
it that have been considered so far in this article. Nevertheless, it is all too
understandable that one would have a certain nagging feeling that something is
78. The McDonnell Douglas opinion itself illustrates the invalidity of judging the overall impact of a
court's reasoning on the basis of the outcome of the specific case: at the end of that opinion, the Court clearly
hinted that the plaintiff's chances of winning on remand were slim. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 806.
79. Id. at 802.
80. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714 (quoted supra Part V).
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problematic about it. If the Latimore argument is so rationally compelling, one
might ask, why is it that, over the more than three years that have elapsed since it
was made, no other court has come to appreciate its force?
In order to investigate this puzzle, one needs to look more closely at what the
courts that apply the McDonnell Douglas standard to lending-discrimination
cases actually do in applying it. The most explicit account of what the standard is
supposed to amount to in this context can be found in the 1993 Eighth Circuit
decision in Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage.8 ' According to that decision, in
order to establish the prima facie case, the plaintiff in such an action
must prove (1) that he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he
applied for and qualified for a loan from Defendants; (3) that the loan
was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) that Defendants continued
to approve loans for applicants with qualifications similar to those of
Plaintiff.
2
The crucial thing to note here is that in the fourth element of the prima facie
case, the court refers to indefinite "loans." Such language is not analogous to the
language of McDonnell Douglas, which, as has been noted above, in the fourth
element of its prima facie case, refers to the position, that is, to the very position
for which the plaintiff applied. Under the fourth element of the McDonnell
Douglas case it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has
continued to receive applications from other applicants for some positions; they
have to have been for the same position.
The Ring court's above-quoted version of the McDonnell Douglas standard
is followed by citations to two other appellate-level cases,83 but neither of them
supports this departure from the original form of McDonnell Douglas. Both of
the cited decisions concern discrimination in providing housing, and in their
versions of the fourth element of the prima facie case, they referred to "the
house"84 and "the housing or rental property"; s5 they did not refer to indefinite
housing.
Yet, the Ring court appears to have been completely unaware that its
reference to indefinite "loans" was a departure both from the original holding of
McDonnell Douglas and from the decisions cited as persuasive authority.
Analogous references to indefinite loans can also be found in other decisions
applying the McDonnell Douglas standard to discrimination in lending.8 6 The
significance of the differetice between definite employment positions referred to
81. Ring, 984 F.2d at 926-27.
82. Id. at 926 (quoting the unpublished opinion of the lower court).
83. HUD v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Selden Apartments v. HUD, 785 F.2d 152,
159 (6th Cir. 1986).
84. Blackwell, 908 F.2d at 870 (emphasis added).
85. Selden Apartments, 785 F.2d at 159 (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., Sallion, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 1329; Gross, 669 F. Supp. at 53.
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in the McDonnell Douglas itself and indefinite loans has escaped all of these
courts.
We are now able to put the split between the Seventh Circuit and other
circuits into a larger doctrinal context. The split is not simply a split on the
isolated issue of whether the McDonnell Douglas standard should be applied to
lending-discrimination cases. Rather, the split on the issue of whether the
definiteness of the reference to "the position," in the original wording of the
standard, is an essential element of the standard. In Latimore, the Seventh Circuit
implicitly took the position that definiteness was essential. Once that
interpretation of the standard is accepted, the Seventh Circuit's syllogism is
compelling, and its conclusion, that the standard cannot be applied in typical
lending cases, is inescapable. On the other hand, courts that reject Latimore
thereby implicitly take the position that definiteness is not essential. That position
makes it possible for them to reject the first premise of the Latimore syllogism,
8 7
and to thus avoid being bound by the syllogism itself. Regardless of which side
of the split about lending discrimination one is sympathetic to, it helps clarity to
think about it in this broader context.
IX. SPLIT OR MERE CONFUSION?
The crucial consideration in favor of the Seventh Circuit's position in
Latimore is its faithfulness to the language of the controlling precedent. It can be,
with good reason, claimed that any possible extension of the McDonnell Douglas
standard to noncompetitive settings should be left to the Supreme Court, and that
until the Court has spoken, the lower courts should faithfully follow the standard
as the Court has formulated it. That faithfulness requires that, in applying the
standard to settings other than those of employment, one preserve the
definiteness of the Court's reference to "the position." As this cannot be done in
typical lending cases, it follows that the standard should not be applied to them
(unless and until the Supreme Court chooses to expressly modify the standard).
On the other hand, in defense of ignoring the definiteness of "the position,"
the argument can be made that the Supreme Court invited lower courts to
experiment with various modifications of the McDonnell Douglas requirements
of the prima facie case, by saying that the requirements were "never intended to
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."8 Moreover, the decisions that applied
McDonnell Douglas to lending discrimination are not alone in ignoring the
definiteness of "the position" in the original formulation of the standard. Even
within the employment-discrimination area (which is the area of the McDonnell
Douglas decision itself), one readily finds courts applying variations of the test
that do not require that the plaintiff be compared with other candidates for the
87. See supra Part V.
88. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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same position. One case requires, for example, as the fourth element of the prima
facie case, only that "other employees of similar qualifications who were not
members of a protected group were promoted at the time plaintiff's request for
promotion was denied." 89 This wording allowed for the possibility that these
other employees were not promoted to the position for which the plaintiff
applied. Other cases require merely that "similarly-situated non-protected
employees received preferential treatment," 9 "that similarly situated employees,
who are not members of the protected group were treated differently," 9' or that
the plaintiff "was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated employee
outside the protected class."9' None of these formulations presupposes a direct
competition between the plaintiff and those with whom the plaintiff is compared.
Nevertheless, the courts using such formulations typically use them in
conjunction with a citation to McDonnell Douglas.9' One court even used both a
wording that presupposes competition for the same position ("employer filled the
position with a person who is not a member of the protected group") 94 and a
formulation that does not ("others who were not members of a protected group
remained in similar positions")95 within the same opinion, apparently without
noticing the difference between them.
Some courts even use a version of the standard that dispenses altogether with
the express requirement for comparison between the plaintiff and others. For the
prima facie case, they require merely that the plaintiff was subjected to some
adverse employment action "under circumstances which give rise to an inference
of unlawful discrimination . 96 That language is taken from Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,97 even though the Court in that decision probably
intended it merely as dictum summarizing the general character of the
McDonnell Douglas standard, not as a substitute for the specific requirements of
the standard itself.98
Up to this point, this article has treated the difference of opinion, as to
whether the definiteness of "the position" in McDonnell Douglas is an essential
feature of the standard, as if it were a circuit split. However, among courts that
89. Marzec v. Marsh, 990 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1993).
90. Dowell v. Rubin, No. 00-3296, 2000 WL 1679440, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 2000).
91. Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000).
92. Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 626 (6th Cir. 1999).
93. A rare example of an opinion that uses a standard of this kind ("treated more harshly or disparately
than the individual who was not a member of his protected group"), but distinguishes it from the McDonnell
Douglas standard itself is Fahrenbacher v. Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 00-3256, 2000 WL 1725463, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2000).
94. Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
96. EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Coach
Stores, 163 F.3d 706, 710 (2d Cir. 1998).
97. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
98. See Aikens, 453 U.S. at 905-06 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that this wording is a
dictum, which did not change the McDonnell Douglas formulation of the requirements of the prima facie case).
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have used versions of the McDonnell Douglas standard that do not presuppose
competition is the Seventh Circuit itself. In Pafford v. Herman, the Seventh
Circuit formulated the fourth element of the prima facie case as requiring merely
that the plaintiff "was denied training given to other similarly situated employees
who were not members of the protected group." 99 That wording clearly does not
presuppose the existence of some specific, individuated training position that the
plaintiff and "other similarly situated employees" were competing for. The
Pafford decision was made two months before Latimore. Chief Judge Posner, the
author of the Latimore opinion, was a member of the panel in Pafford. As the
syllogism of Latimore does not hinge on any changes in the law within the
intervening two months, there is a clear inconsistency between Posner's
argument in Latimore and his signing off on Pafford. The confusion as to how to
treat the reference to "the position" in McDonnell Douglas is thus not really a
split between the Seventh and other circuits. Rather, it is a confusion that
permeates the decisions of the Seventh Circuit itself.
X. AN INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE LATIMORE OPINION
This article has so far focused on what purports to be the core of the
Latimore decision: the argument for the position that the McDonnell Douglas
standard does not apply to typical cases involving allegations of discrimination in
lending. There is, however, in the text of Latimore a seemingly less important
remark that, when its implications are thought through, casts considerable doubt
on whether the Latimore court really took that position. The remark is in the form
of a hypothetical:
Suppose, for example, that Latimore and Eromital (who is white), apply
at roughly the same time for roughly the same-sized loan from the same
Citibank office. The two prospective borrowers are equally creditworthy
and the collateral they offer to put up is appraised at the same amount.
Both applications are forwarded to [a Citibank officer, who] turns down
Latimore's application and approves Eromital's. The similarity in the
situations of the white and the black would be sufficient to impose on
Citibank a duty of explaining why the white was treated better.' °°
The court refers to the reasoning exemplified by this hypothetical as a
"McDonnell Douglas knock off."'0 ' What is noteworthy about this hypothetical is
that the court treats the reasoning in it as legitimate, even though there is no such
thing as the loan that the hypothetical Latimore and Eromital are competing for.
99. Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Malacara v. City of Madison, 224
F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2000).
100. Latimore, 151 F.3dat715.
101. Id.
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The bank in the hypothetical did not announce, "'We are making a $51,000 real
estate loan today; please submit your applications, and we'll choose the
application that we like best and give that applicant the loan."" 2 Nothing in the
hypothetical suggests that the two applicants are competing for one loan that
would have been announced in such a way. Rather, the hypothetical Latimore
and Eromital seem to be independently applying for indefinite parts of the
undifferentiated mass of fungible funds, and there is no indication that the bank's
officer is directly comparing the two applicants. This perfectly realistic
hypothetical is therefore not at all the same as the deliberately unrealistic
hypothetical of a bank announcing that it is making a $51,000 loan on a
particular day, which the court used in presenting its main argument, 0 3 even
though the court seems to think that it is. °'
By making the "Eromital" hypothetical, the court effectively ceases to regard
the definiteness of "the position" in McDonnell Douglas as an essential element
of that standard. It thus gives up the claim that the McDonnell Douglas standard
presupposes that there was a competition between the plaintiff and other
candidates for the position. As this claim is a premise of the central argument of
the case,' 5 giving it up amounts to giving up the central argument.
The Latimore opinion is thus internally inconsistent. What purports to be its
central argument not only contradicts the positions of other circuits, it also
contradicts other parts of the same opinion: parts that, incidentally, appear on the
facing pages of the printed text. '°6
The court suggests that the "Eromital-type" cases are rare. '°7 But, first, even
if they were rare, their rarity would not remove the inconsistency between the
court's main argument and its treatment of the "Eromital" hypothetical. Second,
it is not at all clear why such cases would be all that rare. When the defendant is
a lending institution handling large numbers of applications, it seems quite
possible that among its many applicants there are some who are situated similarly
to the plaintiff in the way presented by the "Eromital" hypothetical.
XI. CONCLUSION
Given that the Latimore opinion as a whole is self-contradictory, one can
make sense of it only by ignoring one of two sides of the contradiction. One way
to do that is to ignore the "Eromital" hypothetical and treat the syllogism that the
102. Id. at 714.
103. Id.
104. See id. ("[W]hen we have an approximation to such a situation, a variant of the McDonnell Douglas
standard may apply, as we shall see." The "such a situation" refers to the unrealistic hypothetical that the court
uses in presenting the main argument; "we shall see" is apparently a reference to the "Eromital" hypothetical.).
105. See supra Part V.
106. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714-15.
107. Id. at 714.
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McDonnell Douglas standard does not apply to lending discrimination as the
operative part of the opinion. If one takes that path, one ends up with an
interesting and rather strong argument, but one also ends up with a circuit split.
The other possible way of making sense of Latimore is to treat the
"Eromital" hypothetical as the operative part of the court's reasoning. Then the
plaintiff loses, not because the McDonnell Douglas standard is inapplicable but
because she did not present enough evidence to satisfy the standard: she did not
point to a suitable "Eromital."' ' If the case is looked at that way, then it is in
harmony with the decisions of the courts applying the McDonnell Douglas test to
lending discrimination, and the circuit split disappears. 09
108. Id. at 715 ("No effort at making such a comparison was attempted here.").
109. It is interesting to note that the Northern District of Illinois in an October 2001 decision applied the
McDonnell Douglas standard to a lending discrimination case, citing its own decision in Latimore and
completely ignoring the Seventh Circuit's opinion. Greer v. Bank One, 2001 WL 1191161, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 4, 2001 ).
